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Abstract
Lender losses on mortgage loans arise from a two-stage process. In the first stage, the borrower stops making
payments if and when default is optimal. The second stage is a lengthy and costly period during which the
lender employs legal remedies to obtain possession and execute a sale of the collateral. This research uses data
on subprime mortgage losses to explore the role of borrower and collateral characteristics, and local legal
requirements, as well as traditional option variables in the decisions of borrowers and lenders. Although
subprime borrowers default earlier, which should reduce lender losses, these borrowers, nevertheless, impose
greater realized losses on mortgage lenders.
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1. Introduction
In option pricing models of borrower behavior, the decision to default is an optimal
stopping problem. At the optimal time of default, the borrower is balancing the value of
the flow of services from the property (the Bimputed^ rent) versus the size of the
mortgage payment and the value of the collateral against the principle balance of the
mortgage. If the loan is a recourse loan so that the borrower can be pursued for any
deficiency on sale, then borrower assets, income, and credit rating will also play a role in
the decision to default.
Clearly, the decision to default is complex and one where the richness of the decision
will not be captured in simple option pricing models. Nevertheless, numerous insights
arise from viewing the decision from the option pricing perspective.
At what price has the value of the house fallen low enough, so that one’s optimal
action is to default? Option pricing shows that the house price must be lower than the
balance on the loan, and depends on interest rates and transactions costs, not just the
value of the home relative to the mortgage.1 Because interest rates are determined in
national markets, their effect should be similar among borrowers. Transactions costs,
however, are more heterogeneous. Relevant considerations include state law and various
personal factors including the so-called Btrigger events.^
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At each payment date, the borrower has the option of: i) making the payment;
ii) prepaying the loan; or iii) defaulting. Default can be viewed as exchanging the value
of the house for the value of the mortgage. Option pricing models provide the conditions
under which default is the optimal strategy for the borrower. For a given set of interest
rates, borrower income, transactions costs, and trigger events, the collateral value must
hit an optimal stopping boundary, usually defined relative to the outstanding principle on
the loan. The optimal strategy maximizes the value of the borrower’s Bput^ option.
In all option models, the parameters of the underlying stochastic processes (e.g., the
drift and volatility), are important determinants of the optimal strategy. In most mortgage
models, stochastic processes for interest rates and collateral prices drive the model. In
more comprehensive models, the borrower’s income and assets might also be stochastic.2
This research uses a large dataset of subprime mortgage loans from a national lender
to provide empirical tests and insights on the subprime borrower’s behavior in default
and on the resulting losses to the lender. The dataset includes extensive characteristics of
the borrower, the loan, and the collateral. Since the dataset includes loans in most states,
the effect of different legal institutions can be tested.
On average, subprime borrowers have lower incomes and less wealth (equity) than
prime borrowers. As a result, we expect these borrowers to be less able to cope with
stressful (trigger) events like unemployment and divorce. From an option theory
perspective, defaults motivated by trigger events are not Boptimal^; therefore subprime
loans provide a laboratory for studying the limits of optimal default in option models.
We dichotomize losses, first, into an expected loss based on optimal behavior in an
option-pricing context and, second, by realized losses to the lender. To preview the
results, we find that subprime borrowers default earlier (at lower expected current loan-to-
value (LTVs)) than prime borrowers. Earlier default should translate into lower realized
losses for lenders on the sale of the collateral, ceteris paribus; but it does not. Losses as a
percent of amortized balance at the time of default are higher for subprime borrowers.
The paper is organized into a discussion of the option-pricing model and testable
hypotheses (comparative statics) arising from the model, a description of the data, a
discussion of the empirical results for expected and realized losses, and a concluding
section.
2. The simulation model
Our point of departure is the option-based model of mortgage loans in Capozza et al.,
(1998).3 Here we sketch the essential features of the model. A more detailed description
is available in Capozza et al., (1998). House prices are assumed to follow geometric
Brownian motion, and interest rates to follow the commonly used Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
mean reverting process. The simulations use discrete monthly time steps so that once
each month, just prior to a mortgage payment, the mortgagor decides whether to prepay,
default, or make the scheduled mortgage payment. We abstract from issues surrounding
delinquency or delay by assuming that default results in immediate loss of the house in
exchange for forgiveness of the debt.
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2.1. House price process
House prices (H ) are assumed to follow the process:
dH ¼ g  ð ÞHdt þ H HdW ð1Þ
where
g = the required return on housing given its risk,
 = the rental rate or Brent-to-price^ ratio for the house (analogous to the dividend
rate on common stock),
H = the volatility of house prices, and
W = standard Brownian motion.
Hedging arguments (e.g., Hull (1993)) yield the risk neutral pricing process given by
dH ¼ r  ð ÞHdt þ H HdV ð2Þ
where
r = the risk free interest rate and
V = an alternate Brownian motion.
2.2. Interest rate process
We assume that interest rates follow a discrete version of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean
reverting process:
dr ¼   rð Þdt þ rdW ð3Þ
where
r = the interest rate,
 = the equilibrium interest rate to which rates will revert,
 = non-negative reversion parameter which describes the intensity at which rates
will return to the equilibrium rate, and
r = the volatility of interest rates.
In Equation (3), if  = 0, the process is a pure random walk model (normal diffusion).
When  = r, the process is a pure random walk over the next instant. For other parameter
values, the interest rate reverts to . The term structure of interest rates is implied by the
difference between r and .
2.3. Transactions costs and trigger events
Two Breal world^ considerations are typically incorporated into contingent-claims
mortgage termination models. The first consideration is the transactions costs of default;
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and the second consideration is Btrigger events^ or exogenous events such as job
relocation that leads to termination. Transactions costs are incorporated into the default
decision by adding a cost term to the outstanding balance at the time of default.
Transactions costs include monetary moving costs, social and family costs of the move,
and financial disruption from a blemished credit standing or deficiency judgments that
claim other assets. In the simulations that follow, transactions costs are modeled as a
fixed dollar cost.
A trigger event converts the multi-period default decision into a one period decision.
There are two types of trigger events. The first type arises if the borrower must move. In
this case, the opportunity or transactions costs of default are minimal since the borrower
incurs the costs whether he defaults or not. The second type occurs when the borrower is
unable to continue making payments. In this case, the transactions costs remain relevant
since default will necessitate a move that need not occur otherwise.
3. The simulations
We initiate the analysis by requiring that the mortgage be fairly priced. The coupon rate
on a loan at origination must set the present value of payments (including default and
prepayment options, and the effect of exogenous terminations) equal to the principle
amount. The model parameters are then varied individually from their base case values
to determine the effect of changing a parameter’s value while holding all other
parameters constant. The results are presented graphically to facilitate assessments of the
direction, the strength, and the linearity of the relationships.
The model evaluates the optimal stopping boundary expressed as the ratio of mortgage
balance to current property value for seasoned mortgages. The range of parameter values
was chosen to be realistic (e.g., 360 month mortgages), and to encompass those used in
other studies. Table 1 presents the base case and range of parameters. Relevant
parameters include the levels and volatilities of house prices and interest rates, the rental
rate, the interest rate reversion parameter, transactions costs, and trigger events.
The method of solution is described in Capozza et al. (1998). We present results for
the stochastic house price volatility, the interest rate process, transactions costs,
remaining term, the exogenous termination rate, and interest rate volatility.
3.1. House price volatility
Figure 1 summarizes the effects for six variables. The first panel of the figure illustrates
the effect of house price volatility on the current LTV (current loan balance/current
house value) stopping boundary. Current LTV at the time of default should be an
important determinant of loss severity. As in most contingent claims models, increases in
volatility increase the value of an option, viz., the embedded put in the mortgage. The
impact on the default decision is to delay default (i.e., exercise of the option) and
increase the current LTV (CLTV) or severity at the time of default.
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3.2. Interest rates
The second panel in Figure 1 illustrates that when spot interest rates increase from the
level at origination, the expected severity increases. Higher interest rates reduce the
market value of the mortgage, giving the borrower an incentive to delay defaulting,
which increases the severity if the loan eventually does default. The effect is larger for
rate increases than for decreases. To allow for this asymmetry, we separate increases and
decreases in the empirical tests that follow.4
3.3. Transactions costs of default
Transactions costs are particularly interesting because they can vary in three ways. First,
each individual faces different transaction costs from family and job characteristics. It is
well known that single individuals are more likely to move than other household types.
Second, transactions costs vary by location since the legal remedies available to lenders
differ. In one-remedy states, borrowers can default with minimal consequences to their
personal finances (see, for example, Jones (1993)). Third, this cost can vary over time for
the same individual when personal circumstances change. A divorce or job change can
greatly reduce the cost of default since the borrower will need to move independently of
Table 1. Base case parameters for numerical modeling.
Variable Base Case Range
Initial house price, H0 ($) 100,000
Initial loan amount, MB0 ($) 90,000
Contract mortgage rate (%) 0.85 monthly (10.2 annual rate)
Monthly mortgage payment, Pmt ($) 803.15
Initial spot interest rate, r0 (%) 0.80 monthly (10.0 effective annual rate) 3 to 16
Gross return to housing, g 0.11
House rental rate,  0.05
House price volatility, H 0.1 0.02 to 0.18
Reversion parameter,  0.1
Interest rate equilibrium,  = r0 0.10
Interest rate volatility, r 0.01 0.004 to 0.016
Deadweight refinance costs, ($),
F + X MB (%)
F = 500, X = 0.5 of loan balance
Transactions cost of default, TC ($) 5,000 j8,000 to 10,000
Exogenous prepayment rate, t (%) 0.5 (50% of PSA) 0 to 10
Notes: The parameters and ranges were used in the simulations. The results are invariant to house price. The
implied initial loan-to-value is 90 percent. Gross return to housing (11 percent) is similar to discount rates on
commercial property (11 percent Y12 percent). The rental rates bracket the range of values found by Capozza
et al. (1997). House price volatility is also based on values in Capozza et al. (1997). The range of interest rate
reversion and volatility parameters are similar to ranges in Chan et al. (1992). Refinance and default costs are
similar to Kau et al. (1994). Exogenous prepayment rate is set below (PSA) because optimal defaults are
already included in the modeling.
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the default decision. Ambrose et al., (1997) point out that transactions costs can even be
negative for borrowers who may enjoy a period of free rent before foreclosure is
completed.
The third panel in Figure 1 shows the effect of these transactions costs on severity.
Higher transactions costs cause borrowers to delay default, thereby increasing
severity.
3.4. Remaining term
The fourth panel illustrates the effect of remaining term. Remaining term is effectively
the time to expiration of the option to default. The effect on severity is quite small when
there is substantial time to the end of term (which there is in our data) and is positive as
in other contingent claims models.
Figure 1. The simulated effect of selected covariates on the optimal stopping boundary.
Notes: The graphs above illustrate the simulated effect of the indicated variable on the stopping boundary for
current loan-to-value. The parameters for the base case and the range of variation are described in Table 1.
House price volatility, interest rate changes, and transactions costs have the largest effects. More minor effects
arise with remaining term, exogenous prepayment probability, and interest rate volatility.
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3.5. Exogenous prepayment probability
The fifth panel shows that the effect of variation in the exogenous probability of
prepayment, measured as a multiple of the PSA rate, is quite small. High exogenous
prepayments can arise from borrower mobility or other reasons.
3.6. Interest rate volatility
The sixth panel shows the effect of interest rate volatility. The effect on severity again is
quite small. As with house price volatility, interest rate volatility increases the value of
delaying a default and consequently raises severity. Since the variables are difficult to
measure and the effects are small, we do not attempt to include proxies for these latter
two variables in the empirical analysis.
3.7. Trigger events
Historically, industry analysts have assumed that exogenous events (e.g., divorce or
unemployment) play a major role in mortgage default. In the model, exogenous events
are random events with a given probability of occurrence. The borrower realizes that
exogenous events may occur in the future, and adjusts the decision to default or prepay
appropriately. We can separate the defaults into those that are due to the optimal
decision at the time, and those which are a response to an exogenous event. In the base
case, it is assumed that transactions costs are present for all default decisions. In many
cases, however, an exogenous event may result in several changes for the decision
makerVsome of which may reduce the transactions costs of defaulting to zero. For
example, if a move results from this exogenous event (perhaps a change of employment
location), then the moving costs are no longer relevant to the default decision. For this
reason, Capozza et al., (1998) also analyzed a modified model when transactions costs
are zero if the exogenous event occurs. If a trigger event occurs, the borrower is more
likely to default because a trigger event removes the option value of delay. When
transactions costs are assumed to fall to zero if a trigger event occurs, borrowers do
default at a higher rate. However, the overall conclusion is that trigger events play a
minor role.
4. The data description
The data are loans from a national lender of subprime loans with borrowers over a wide
range of ages, credit scores, and loan terms. The loans were originated from 1994 to
2001 under a broad range of interest rates and economic conditions. During this period
4,010 loans defaulted.
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The data encompass loans in most states, and on a variety of properties including,
mobile homes, condominiums, and units with up to four dwellings, in addition to single-
family homes. There are indicators for whether the property is owner occupied, or is an
investment property. Loan type includes both variable and fixed rate loans. Prepayment
penalties were in force for many of the loans during their early life. While we do not
have complete coverage of credit scores, we have scores for about 40 percent of the
loans, with an average credit score of 556, which is very much subprime.5 Additional
borrower information that has not been available to other researchers includes time at
job, time at property, payment-to-income and debt-to-income, and purpose of the loan
(e.g., purchase, cash-out refinance, etc.). Table 2 reports summary statistics for selected
variables.
4.1. Variable descriptions
Five types of variables are included in the analysis of the stopping boundary and of the
losses and expenses. We group these into variables motivated by option pricing,
borrower characteristics, variables describing the judicial process, collateral character-
istics, and variables that attempt to capture trigger events.
4.2. Option variables and loan terms
BExpected CLTV at Default^ is the ratio of the amortized balance at default to the
appraised value at origination adjusted for the change in market prices as measured by
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) price index for the state.
This variable attempts to measure the current LTV at the time the borrower makes the
decision to default.
BRemaining Term^ is the number of months remaining on the loan at the time of
default. This is a measure of time to expiration of the put option, and the expected sign in
the stopping boundary equation is positive.
BHouse Price Volatility^ is the OFHEO measure of annual house price volatility
arising from the estimates of repeat sales indices for each state.
BInterest Rate Changes (Up and Down)^ is the change in market interest rates since
loan origination.
BLoan Age1/2^ is the square root of the time since origination. This variable attempts
to capture the stochastic evolution of collateral prices. Since defaults are drawn from the
tail of the house price distribution and since it takes time for prices to wander from the
mean of the distribution, we expect that defaults can occur at lower market prices for
older loans.
Other loan characteristics that are available in the dataset include indicators of fixed
versus variable rates, discount points, and prepayment penalties.
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4.3. Borrower characteristics
BInterest Rate Premium^ is the premium of the mortgage contract rate above the prime
mortgage rate at the time of origination. Since these are subprime loans, the interest
premium charged by the lender is a measure of the quality of the borrower as assessed by
the lender at origination. In the empirical analysis that follows, we use this variable
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Option variables and loan terms
LTV at Origination 0.79 0.10 0.45 1.08
Expected CLTV at default 0.72 0.08 0.39 0.98
Interest rate up 0.33 0.45 0.00 2.32
Interest rate down 0.29 0.43 0.00 2.48
Term (months) 352 34 120 360
Loan age (months) 14.31 10.99 2.00 83.00
Fixed rate 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Discount points 5.41 2.12 0.00 12.00
Prepayment penalty 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
House price index (OFHEO) 1.05 0.05 0.86 1.42
Borrower characteristics
Interest rate premium 3.45 1.55 j2.76 9.66
Cash-out refinance 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Not owner occupied 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Low documentation 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Purchase money 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Credit score (N = 1,597) 556 55 420 787
Loan payment-to-income 0.22 0.10 0.01 0.81
Total debt obligations-to-income 0.35 0.13 0.00 0.85
Time on job 6.35 7.46 0.00 50.00
Time in property 4.82 8.76 0.00 255
Judicial process
Slow foreclosure state 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Collateral characteristics
Manufactured housing 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Condo 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Multi-family 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Trigger events
Divorce rate 4.28 0.96 1.70 6.60
Unemployment rate 4.51 1.26 1.90 9.30
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for selected variables in the database. BExpected CLTV at
Default^ is the amortized balance at default divided by the purchase price adjusted for market appreciation.
BInterest Rate Premium^ is the difference between the coupon on the loan and the prime mortgage rate at the
time of origination. BLow Documentation^ is an indicator that the loan is not fully documented (e.g., sources of
income). BSlow Foreclosure States^ are the states that Fannie Mae (FNMA) has identified as having a slow
foreclosure process usually because judicial proceedings and long redemption periods are required. There are
4,010 observations in the dataset.
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rather than the credit bureau score because it is a more comprehensive measure of the
lender’s assessment of borrower quality than credit bureau scores and because bureau
scores are missing for many of the observations.
BCash-Out Refinance^ is an indicator variable that the borrower increased the balance
of the mortgage at the time of origination (i.e., refinanced). This is a measure of the
discount rate and savings behavior of the borrower.
BNot Owner Occupied^ is an indicator that the property is not owner occupied.
BLow Documentation^ is an indicator that the borrower provided limited or no
documentation of income and assets.
4.4. Judicial process
BSlow Foreclosure State^ is an indicator that Fannie Mae (FNMA) views the state legal
process as slow and expensive, primarily because of judicial sales and long redemption
periods.
4.5. Collateral characteristics
BManufactured Housing^ is an indicator that the property is a manufactured home.
BCondo^ is an indicator that the property is structured as a condominium.
BHouse Age^ is the age of the property in years.
4.6. Trigger events
BUnemployment^ is the state unemployment rate at the time of default.
BDivorce^ is the state divorce rate at the time of default.
5. The empirical results
5.1. Analysis of the stopping boundary: Expected losses and time to default
This section analyzes the stopping boundary or current LTV that triggers default. Our
initial analysis investigates the relationship between the stopping boundary and
variables that measure option-theory constructs, borrower characteristics, foreclosure
costs, and trigger events. The analysis complements the earlier work of Lekkas
et al., (1993), Crawford and Rosemblatt (1995), and Ambrose et al., (2001). Our focus
is on subprime mortgages where borrower idiosyncrasies are likely to be more im-
portant. Our more detailed dataset allows us to probe more deeply into many issues raised
earlier.
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The results appear in Table 3. Model 1 includes only the option pricing variables as
regressors. The dependent variable is a measure of current LTV at the time of default
where the numerator is the balance on the loan at default and the denominator is the
review appraisal done at origination, adjusted for changes in market prices as measured
by the OFHEO repeat sales indices. The denominator reflects only the market price
movements and not the property-specific movements in prices. In general, we expect
properties that actually default to be drawn from the tail of the house price distri-
bution. If house prices follow the typical diffusion process, then a specific property can
deviate more from the initial price in proportion to the square root of time. Therefore,
we include root time as an independent variable to capture the idiosyncratic
movements. In all the models of Table 3, root time is highly significant and has the
expected sign.
The second variable in Model 1 is the remaining term on the mortgage. The coefficient
is positive and significant, which is consistent with the expectation from the simulation.
With a distant expiration date on the option to default, borrowers will optimally wait and
default at higher CLTVs (lower collateral prices).
Table 3. The stopping boundary: analysis of expected losses.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Option theory
Intercept 0.68 36.9 0.80 46.4 0.78 43.8
(Loan age)**½ j0.017 j18.0 j0.020 j22.8 j0.020 j22.7
Remaining term 0.0037 9.6 0.0024 6.8 0.0025 7.0
HP volatility j0.018 j0.1 j0.062 j0.4 j0.34 j2.1
Interest rate up 0.011 3.7 0.010 3.9 0.011 4.1
Interest rate down j0.0073 j2.2 j0.0086 j2.9 j0.010 j3.5
Borrower/transactions costs
Interest rate premium j0.013 j17.7 j0.012 j16.9
Cash-out refinance j0.014 j6.8 j0.016 j7.4
Not owner occupied j0.034 j11.3 j0.035 j11.3
Low documentation j0.033 j15.5 j0.034 j16.0
Foreclosure costs
Slow foreclosure state j0.0059 j2.7 j0.00091 j0.3
Trigger events
Divorce rate 0.0053 4.4
Unemployment rate 0.0040 4.2
R2
0.15 0.30 0.31
Notes: Dependent variable is the BExpected CLTV at Default^ (i.e., the current loan-to-value ratio at the
time of default), defined as the ratio of the outstanding balance on the loan at the last payment date to the
appraised value of the property at the time of loan origination adjusted for changes in the OFHEO local
house price index.
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The OFHEO measure of house price volatility is not statistically significant. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that subprime borrowers either are not aware of
differences in volatility or ignore the differences if they are aware.
Changes in interest rates since origination are expected to have a positive impact on the
stopping boundary. The results are consistent with this expectation. The simulation
suggests that the impact of interest rates is greater for increases than for decreases. There is
weak support for this result since the absolute value of the BInterest Rate Up^ coefficient is
greater than the BInterest Rate Down^ coefficient, but the difference is not statistically
significant.
Overall, Model 1 provides support for the hypothesis that borrowers time defaults in
ways that are consistent with option pricing theory. It is worth noting that the mean of
the dependent variable, CLTV, is only 72 percent, even though the loss on the sale of
defaulted properties is 23 percent, which implies a CLTV of 130 percent. The current
LTV at the time of default (our dependent variable) is adjusted only for changes in
market prices since origination. This implies that when house prices decline enough to
precipitate a default, most of the change is idiosyncratic rather than market related.
Model 2 of Table 3 explores the role of borrower characteristics and foreclosure costs.
The option pricing variables have impacts similar to those in Model 1. Among the
borrower characteristics is the BInterest Rate Premium^ (relative to prime mortgages)
paid by the borrower. This variable is a summary statistic for the lenders assessment of
the creditworthiness of the borrower. It is highly significant both statistically and
economically. Weaker borrowers default earlier (lower stopping boundary).
Three other borrower characteristics are highly significant: BCash-Out Refinance^;
BNot Owner Occupied^; and BLow Documentation.^ These indicator variables reduce
the stopping boundary from 1.4 to 3.4 percent. We interpret the BCash-Out Refinance^
borrowers as having a higher discount rate (and lower savings rate). When the borrower
does not occupy the property, transactions costs may be lower (default does not force the
borrower to move). BLow Documentation^ borrowers are often self-employed and
entrepreneurial. Income for these borrowers is more variable, subjecting the borrower to
liquidity constraints more frequently.
The final variable in Model 2 is the BSlow Foreclosure State^ indicator. In slow
foreclosure states, borrowers can live rent-free for a longer period. Free rent acts like a
negative transactions cost and encourages default at a lower stopping boundary. The
coefficient is significant but small economically, suggesting that even if subprime
borrowers are aware of differences in foreclosure requirements, there is little impact on
their stopping strategy.
In Model 3, we add the state divorce and unemployment rates at the time of default as
measures of trigger events. In both cases, the coefficients do not have the expected sign.
Therefore, there is little evidence to support the expected role of trigger events. The
remaining coefficients are similar to those in Model 2 with the exception of BSlow
Foreclosure State,^ which loses its significance in Model 3.
To summarize the results of this section, the analysis indicates that both option-pricing
and borrower-characteristic variables significantly affect the stopping boundary for
subprime mortgage borrowers. There is little evidence to support the expected role of
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trigger events and only weak evidence that legal requirements affect the stopping
boundary. Weaker borrowers (higher Interest Rate Premium) default earlier at expected
lower CLTVs (i.e., higher house values relative to the loan amount) and might be
expected to impose lower losses on lenders. The next section studies the realized losses.
5.2. Analysis of realized losses
In this section, we analyze the losses as a percent of loan balance at the time of default in
a stylized manner. The total loss from a default is defined as the sum of the loss on the
sale of the property plus interest expense plus other expenses (e.g., legal and
maintenance). This identity allows us to decompose the total losses into the components
and identify the specific drivers of the three components as well as the total loss. When
regressing the additive expenses on an identical set of regressors, the sum of the resulting
coefficients will add to the coefficient for total losses (subject to rounding error).
Each component of expense is regressed on a set of borrower and collateral
characteristics and the BSlow Foreclosure State^ indicator. Table 4 displays the results.
Total losses are about half due to the loss on sale, and a quarter each to other expenses
and interest expenses.
5.3. Sale loss expense
The first model in Table 4 explains the BSale Loss Expense^ defined as one minus the
net sale proceeds divided by loan balance. The loss on the sale of the collateral can be
influenced by a complex set of factors. In addition to the borrower’s stopping strategy,
three other considerations play a role. First is the condition of the property. The
condition may be related to the age of the property, the quality of construction, and to
borrower maintenance and time to foreclosure. Second is the atypicality of a property.
Unusual properties may be more difficult to sell and impose larger losses on the lender.
Finally, some borrowers may systematically overpay for properties due to lack of
knowledge. The results in Table 4 for BSale Loss Expense^ include the net effects of all
these factors, which cannot be easily isolated.
The coefficients on the property characteristic variables tell us that the losses from sale
are higher for manufactured housing and for older homes. The economic significance of
these variables is very high with losses 17 percent higher for manufactured housing and
almost 4 percent per decade higher for older homes. Manufactured housing is generally
considered to be of lower quality with higher depreciation rates than site-built housing.
Older homes tend to be more atypical and require more maintenance. Atypical homes are
also less liquid and sell with wider bid-ask spreads (see Capozza et al., (2005)).
Among the borrower characteristics, weaker borrowers (higher interest rate premium)
and non-occupants cause significantly higher losses for lenders. BLow Documentation^
borrowers impose smaller sale losses.
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Slow foreclosure process adds over 9 percent to the sale loss. Whether this is due to
depreciation of prices or to deterioration of the property during foreclosure cannot be
determined.
5.4. Other expenses
For BOther Expenses^ (second model in Table 4), condos and older homes impose larger
losses. Weak borrowers and non-occupants also increase Other Expenses. Slow Foreclosure
adds an additional 3 percent to Other Expenses. During the foreclosure process, unlike for
fee-simple housing, condo fees accumulate and must be paid at or before sale. Weak (poor
credit) borrowers and non-occupants are likely to impose more depreciation on properties.
5.5. Interest expenses
Higher interest expenses should arise if the property is in foreclosure for a longer period
of time and if the coupon on the loan is higher. In the BInterest Expenses^ column, the
Interest Rate Premium and the Slow Foreclosure State indicator are highly significant.
5.6. Total losses
The major determinants of Total Losses include manufactured homes (15 percent
higher), older homes (about 4 percent higher per decade), weak borrowers (almost 5
percent higher per percent of interest rate premium), non-occupants (12 percent higher),
and slow foreclosure (16 percent higher).
Not surprisingly, the effect of the property indicators on total losses arises primarily
from the additional losses on sale. Weak borrowers affect total losses through all three
expense components. Non-occupants affect total losses through sale losses and other
expenses. Slow foreclosure affects all three component expenses.
To summarize this section, less than half of total losses arise from the sale of the
property. The other half includes interest expenses and other (legal and maintenance)
expenses. All three categories of variables, borrower and collateral characteristics and
the foreclosure process are important determinants of total losses. Losses on mortgages
to subprime borrowers are higher than for better borrowers despite the shorter time to
default of subprime borrowers.
6. Conclusions
The process in which borrowers default on mortgages and lenders eventually realize
losses is a complex one involving several stages, many parties, and considerable time.
Traditional approaches in the academic literature have focused on loss severity from the
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perspective of option pricing. However, option-pricing variables are difficult to quantify
in many cases and, although significant, have surprisingly little power to explain the
variation in these decisions.
In this research, we have explored loss severity for subprime mortgages using a rich
dataset that includes much detail on the borrower and the collateral as well as on the
various expenses that compose total losses. We find that borrower characteristics play an
important role in determining both the stopping boundary and eventual total losses.
Property characteristics and legal requirements are mainly important in explaining the
various expenses that compose total losses. Similar to other research studies, we find that
trigger events do not have the predicted impact on these decisions.
The market-adjusted current LTVs at the time of default are actually lower than at
origination, on average. This implies that idiosyncratic factors play an important role in
defaults on mortgage loans. That is, the loans in our sample did not default because there
were significant declines in collateral prices in local housing markets. Rather, they
defaulted despite increases in market prices.
One idiosyncratic factor is the creditworthiness of the borrower. Weaker subprime
borrowers default earlier, which should result in lower losses on sale of the collateral.
Nevertheless, lenders lose more on defaulted loans to weak borrowers relative to the
balance at the time of default. We conjecture that there are three possible reasons for this
result. First, subprime borrowers may be less skilled at property care and maintenance. If
so, lenders will recover the defaulted properties in worse condition and be forced to sell
at a lower price or pay substantial rehabilitation expenses. The significance of borrower
creditworthiness in the Other Expenses regression supports this scenario. Second,
subprime borrowers may be less knowledgeable about property values and may overpay
for the properties relative to market prices. Third, subprime borrowers may be buying
properties that appreciate less or deteriorate faster. This scenario could occur if
borrowers buy properties with characteristics for which we cannot control such as
properties in declining neighborhoods.
It has been widely documented that borrowers with poor credit histories have higher
default rates. In this study, we have documented that weak borrowers also impose higher
losses given a default. The higher losses arise from all three components of losses: lower
sale prices; higher interest expenses; and higher legal and maintenance expenses.
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Notes
1. The use of option theory in mortgage analysis dates from as early as Findlay and Capozza (1977). More
modern treatments commence with Foster and Van Order (1984).
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2. A heated debate in the mortgage literature has centered on whether borrowers do in actuality default
optimally. Like the early debates about the efficient markets hypothesis, the concept of optimal default can
easily degenerate into a tautology unless Boptimal^ is defined carefully. Because of the complexity of the
decision, one would not expect simplified models to fully capture the complexity so that we should expect to
see Bnon-optimal^ behavior as defined by simplified models.
3. The model is similar in spirit to those in Kau and Keenan (1999) and Lekkas et al. (1993).
4. When interest rates fall, the likely outcome is for the borrower to refinance which leads to the asymmetric
result.
5. Fair Isaac Co. reports that a credit score of 575 puts a borrower in the bottom 10 percent.
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